Army Transformation

Report to the Congress of the United States

February 2007

Improving the capabilities of Soldiers
to conduct full-spectrum joint operations
and defend the Nation in the 21st Century

2007 Army Transformation Report to the Congress of the United States

With the strong support of the President, Congress, and the Secretary of Defense, the Army has made significant progress in the most comprehensive transformation of its forces since World War II. The Army is transforming to meet the challenges of the new security environment characterized by persistent conflict with adaptive enemies in complex environments. Army transformation improves the capabilities of Soldiers engaged in the long war against terrorism. Army transformation improves the capability of units to conduct full-spectrum operations and meet traditional, irregular, catastrophic and disruptive challenges. Army transformation improves the capability of the joint force to defend the homeland, deter conflict in critical regions, respond promptly to small-scale contingencies and swiftly defeat the enemy in major combat operations.

The mission is to build a campaign-quality Army with joint and expeditionary capabilities now to provide relevant and ready landpower to combatant commanders and maintain the quality of the All-Volunteer Force. Adaptive leadership, innovative concepts and lessons learned from recent operations have produced corresponding changes to doctrine, organizations, training, materiel, leadership, education, personnel, and facilities. The Army's Concept Strategy, the Army Modular Force, Army Force Generation, Reset the Force, Network-Enabled Battle Command, Future Combat Systems, Force Stabilization, the Warrior Ethos, Pentathlete Leader Development, the Global Defense Posture Realignment and Business Transformation are complementary and fully integrated transformation initiatives that achieve synergistic effects.

The Army must address several priorities: growing the Army to meet strategic requirements; the wartime costs of equipment reset and unit readiness; the need to transform and modernize the force; and taking care of Soldiers and their families. With additional resources, the Army will grow from 70 to 76 modular brigade combat teams and approximately 225 support brigades to build strategic depth, meet the enduring operational demand and preserve the All-Volunteer Force. To form whole, cohesive units that are ready to fight and support civil authorities, the Army must continue to fill the "holes in the force" to reduce equipment shortages accepted under tiered readiness; provide all Soldiers in combat with necessary equipment and force protection; and reset equipment that is worn, damaged or destroyed in current operations. The Army must complete modular conversion to meet joint force requirements for full-spectrum operations and modernize with Future Combat Systems to remain relevant in the 21st century. Ultimately, we believe Army transformation produces the optimum mix of land capabilities for the joint force, manages risk prudently, and is both affordable and essential for the Nation to win the war today and prepare for an uncertain future.

Peter J. Schoomaker
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff

Francis J. Harvey
Secretary of the Army

CONGRESSIONAL REPORT REQUIREMENT

Army Modularity (House Resolution 5122, 109-452, page 31).

The committee continues to support the Army's restructuring from a division based force to a more readily deployable brigade centric force, a process known as modularity, and the committee understands that modularity remains a top priority of the Chief of Staff of the Army. **However, the committee remains concerned that the Army has not provided sufficient information for Congress to assess the capabilities, costs, affordability, and risks of the Army's modularity implementation plan.** The committee notes that the Army's cost estimate for completing modularity by 2011 has grown from an initial estimate of $28.0 billion in 2004 to a current estimate of $52.5 billion. Further, in the ''2005 Modularity'' report submitted to Congress, the Army states a requirement for 77 brigade combat teams (BCTs). Of the 77 BCTs, 35 were to be heavy BCTs consisting of Abrams tanks and Bradley fighting vehicles. In the ''2006 Modularity'' report and the 2007 budget request the requirement is for 70 BCTs, of which 33 would be heavy BCTs. The committee is concerned about the Army's rationale to reduce the total BCT requirement and furthermore, it remains unclear to the committee what impact the current modularity strategy will have on meeting the needs of the combatant commanders. **Accordingly, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense to obtain from each combatant commander, an assessment of the Army's modularity initiative to include issues or concerns regarding modularity designs, equipment, personnel and/or rotation strategy.** Further, the committee directs the Secretary to submit a report, including the assessments from the combatant commanders, to the Senate Committee on Armed Services and the House committee on Armed Services with the submission of the President's budget for fiscal year 2008.

Report Organization

The introduction describes Army transformation in strategic context. It reviews the strategic requirements, the current operational tempo, the challenges that make Army transformation imperative, the genesis of Army transformation and how it has evolved.

The second section focuses on the Army Modular Force. It describes the modular organization designs and their capabilities. It reviews the progress of building modular capabilities. It explains how the Army Modular Force improves the strategic flexibility and operational capability of combatant commanders. Finally, it addresses specific questions about capabilities, cost, affordability and risk. (Note, for additional detailed information about equipping and funding the Army Modular Force initiative, please refer to the Army's report in fulfillment of the requirements found in Section 323 of the FY 2007 National Defense Authorization Act.)

The third section describes the Army Force Generation rotational strategy. It explains how the Army integrates modular units into this cyclic training and readiness process and the capabilities the Army can provide to the joint force on a sustained basis.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

For over 230 years, the Army has adapted to meet new challenges and defend the Nation. The evolving international security environment since September 11th and the corresponding changes to the National Security and Defense Strategies made it imperative to accelerate Army transformation to improve the capabilities of Soldiers in combat and to provide relevant and ready landpower to combatant commanders. The logic of Army transformation is based on joint force requirements to conduct continuous full-spectrum operations (offense, defense, stability, civil support) in persistent conflict ranging from peacekeeping to warfighting.

The Army Campaign Plan directs comprehensive strategic change across doctrine, organizations, training, materiel, leadership, education, personnel and facilities to build a campaign-quality Army with joint and expeditionary capabilities. The Army views transformation as the continuous evolution of capabilities over time from the current to future force. Transforming the Army at war requires a carefully managed balance between sustaining and enhancing the capabilities of the current force to win the war today, while investing in capabilities for the future force to meet the complex and unpredictable challenges of tomorrow. The Army must integrate transformation activities with the strategic posture to support current operations and its capabilities-based program and budget. This dynamic process requires the Army to adjudicate risk and refine its transformation plan on a continuous basis.

With the strong support of the President and the Congress, the Army acted quickly to resource and improve the warfighting capabilities of the current force. In 2001, the Army began the long war on terror with an equipment and modernization shortfall amounting to $56 billion based on existing structure and requirements. These “holes in the force” were accepted under the concept of tiered readiness and based on the assumption there would be time and funds to resource “late deploying” units properly before deployment. Since Fiscal Year (FY) 2001, the Army has been allocating resources in its base budget and supplemental funding to fill these “holes in the force” and equip all active component (AC) and reserve component (RC) units to common organizational designs. The Army is committed to form whole, cohesive units that are fully manned, equipped and trained to accomplish their assigned missions. Army commanders identified an additional $17 billion in operational equipment necessary to increase the force protection and warfighting capabilities of Soldiers in Afghanistan and Iraq. Examples include up-armored tactical wheeled vehicles, improved body armor, improved C4ISR and increased common equipment for Special Operations Forces. The Army continues to resource such equipment for the war in its base budget and supplemental funding. The requirements to reset unit equipment reflect the costs to repair, replace and recapitalize equipment that is worn, damaged or destroyed in the war. These costs are over and above the normal costs to sustain the Army. Currently requested in the FY 2008 supplemental, the Army expects reset costs to be about $13.5 billion a year until the end of operations plus two to three years. The cost to reset equipment will increase with the “plus up” of forces in Iraq and the growth of the Army.

Modular conversion reorganizes the Operational Army from large division-size formations designed to defeat traditional threats in conventional campaigns to more versatile and deployable brigade-size units designed to support joint force requirements for full-spectrum operations. To improve the capabilities of Soldiers and to provide relevant and ready landpower to the joint force commander, the Army will:

- Resource $52.5 billion in its base budget and program from FY 2005 to FY 2011 to reorganize the Operational Army into modular theater armies, theater support structure, corps and division headquarters, brigade combat teams (BCT), and multi-functional and functional support brigades based on common organizational designs for both AC and RC forces.
- Grow the Army from 70 to 76 BCTs and approximately 225 support brigades to build strategic depth, meet enduring operational demand and relieve stress on Soldiers and families to preserve the All-Volunteer Force. This growth will expand the deployable force pool from 33 former brigades to 48 BCTs in the AC, and from 15 readily available enhanced separate brigades to 28 BCTs in the RC.
- Growing the Army depends on a commensurate level of national commitment that results in timely, adequate and predictable resourcing to form whole, cohesive units that are fully manned, equipped and trained to accomplish their assigned missions.
- Growing the Army requires the ability to execute $6 billion worth of scheduled military construction and Base Realignment and Closure projects requested in the 2007 President's Budget.
- Improve the strategic flexibility to tailor modular expeditionary forces to meet joint force requirements on a "plug and play" basis without extensive task organization and augmentation that decreased the readiness of former divisional units.
- Enable the deployable theater army, corps and division headquarters to meet the increased operational demand for joint force headquarters.
- Improve the Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) and warfighting capabilities in modular units to conduct full-spectrum operations in today's complex environments.
- Convert over 100,000 spaces of force structure to build additional military police, transportation, petroleum/water distribution, civil affairs, special forces, psychological operations and biological detection units to conduct full-spectrum operations.

The Army must modernize to improve the warfighting capability of the current modular force in the long war on terror and to develop the strategically responsive, full-spectrum dominant future modular force. Future Combat Systems (FCS) is the centerpiece of the Army's modernization strategy and is critical to the Army's continued relevance in the 21st century. The Army will:

- Spin-out mature FCS technologies beginning in 2008 to improve the capabilities of the current force in the long war on terror, including the improved network-enabled C4ISR capabilities that support interdependent joint warfighting.
- Field FCS BCTs beginning in 2015 to achieve the optimum balance of deployability, mobility, lethality and survivability to conduct successful early-entry, full-spectrum operations and meet Joint Swiftness Goals.

To meet strategic requirements in the new security environment, the Army must adapt from tiered readiness to cyclic readiness. Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) is the structured progression of increased unit readiness over time, resulting in recurring periods of availability of trained, ready and cohesive units prepared for operational deployment in support of combatant commander requirements. Operational requirements drive the ARFORGEN training and readiness process, which in turn supports the prioritization and synchronization of institutional functions to resource, recruit, organize, man, equip, train, sustain, source, mobilize, and deploy units on a cyclic basis. The goal is to achieve a sustained, more predictable posture to generate trained and ready modular expeditionary forces tailored to joint force requirements more effectively and efficiently. Fully implementing the Army Modular Force and Army Force Generation will yield a number of advantages in the future steady-state security posture to include:

- A continuous supply of 20-21 trained and ready modular BCTs with enablers in the available force pool to meet steady-state joint force requirements.
- The capability to surge an additional 20-21 BCTs with enablers from the ready force pool, given the time and resources to man, equip and train whole, cohesive units.
- Stabilized personnel who join, train, deploy and fight together in the same unit.
- A cyclic training process that supports the goal to be fully trained for full-spectrum operations in the full 3-year (AC) and 6-year (RC) operational deployment cycles.
- Recurrent, assured, predictable access to cohesive RC units.
- Reduced post-mobilization training time for RC units.
- Deployment planning objectives to identify high-demand, low-density units.
- More predictable unit deployments for the Army, Soldiers, families and employers.
- Allocating resources based on unit mission priorities and deployment schedules.
- The opportunity to synchronize a broad range of Generating Force processes.

The Army must address several priorities: the size of the Army to meet strategic requirements; the wartime costs of equipment reset and unit readiness; the need to transform and modernize the force; and taking care of Soldiers and their families. Recent decisions to expand the size of the Army reflect the clear recognition of the President, the Secretary of Defense and the Congress of the importance of joint ground forces to meet strategic requirements and the increasing stress on Soldiers and families as a result of the enduring operational demand. However, the Army must avoid the dangers of a “hollow Army,” which results from maintaining large numbers of units on paper that in reality lack the people, equipment, training and support needed to accomplish their assigned missions. Just as the strength of a rope results from strong bands woven tightly together, the strength of the Army results from whole, cohesive units that are fully manned, equipped, trained and ready to conduct full spectrum operations today—and modernized with the Future Combat Systems to meet the challenges of tomorrow. With timely, adequate and predictable resources, the Army can build the force structure necessary to meet its strategic requirements with whole, cohesive units that are ready to fight and to support civil authorities when required. Ultimately, Army transformation produces the optimum mix of land capabilities for the joint force, manages risk prudently, and is both affordable and essential for the Nation to win the war today and prepare for an uncertain future.

ARMY TRANSFORMATION IN STRATEGIC CONTEXT

The international security environment has evolved significantly since the Cold War, producing corresponding changes to National Security and Defense Strategies. Observing ethnic conflict, outlaw states, weapons of mass destruction and terrorism are global concerns that transcend national borders, the 1997 *National Security Strategy* defined the "imperative of engagement: We must be prepared and willing to use all appropriate instruments of national power to influence the actions of other states and non-state actors." Responding to the terrorist attacks on September 11th, the 2002 *National Security Strategy* established the priority to "disrupt and destroy terrorist organizations of global reach" and emphasized transformation of our military forces to ensure the ability to achieve decisive results. The 2004 *National Military Strategy* defined the required attributes of joint force transformation: "fully integrated, expeditionary, networked, decentralized, adaptable, decision superiority, lethality." The 2005 *National Defense Strategy* established a framework of evolving and overlapping "traditional, irregular, catastrophic and disruptive challenges." The 2006 *Quadrennial Defense Review* (QDR) force planning construct defined steady-state and surge requirements in three objective areas: Defend the Homeland; Prevail in the War on Terror and Conduct Irregular Operations; and Conduct and Win Conventional Campaigns. The 2006 QDR report also described the vision for joint ground forces: "a new breed of warrior able to move more easily between disparate mission sets while preserving their depth of skill in primary specialties. Future warriors will be as proficient in irregular operations, including counterinsurgency and stabilization operations, as they are today in high-intensity combat. They will be modular in structure at all levels, largely self-sustaining, and capable of operating both in traditional formations as well as disaggregating into smaller, autonomous units." The new security environment and corresponding changes in strategy have profound implications for the Army.

Joint ground forces are proving to be the primary military instrument for creating favorable and enduring security conditions in many crisis regions around the world. Since 1989, the Army has supported 43 joint operations, many of which require a continuous rotation of forces to sustain. Today, the Nation has over 258,000 American Soldiers deployed in 80 countries conducting theater security cooperation and joint and multi-national operations in support of national strategic objectives. Joint ground forces bear the heaviest burden fighting simultaneous campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq. Over 700,000 active and reserve Soldiers have served overseas in the war on terrorism. Active component brigade combat teams deploy to combat at a rate of one year deployed for one year training at home station. This accelerated pace of deployment is one full year faster than the Army's minimum goal of one year deployed for two years training at home station. All of the Army's operational brigades are deployed conducting combat operations, are preparing for their next deployment as rapidly as possible, or are committed to deter conflict in critical regions. Some brigades are now on their third, year-long combat tour. Most significantly, the Army has suffered over 2,000 Soldiers killed and 15,000 Soldiers wounded in combat. Resourcing Army transformation is essential to enhance joint ground force capabilities and improve mission effectiveness.

The increased operational demand and the new security environment revealed several challenges for the Army that made accelerated transformation imperative. First, the Army needed to transition rapidly from a peacetime to a wartime posture. In 2001, the Army began the long war on terror with an equipment and modernization shortfall amounting to $56 billion based on existing structure and requirements. These "holes in the force" were accepted under the concept of tiered readiness and based on the assumption there would be time and funds to resource "late deploying" units properly before deployment. With the campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Army needed to form whole, cohesive units that are ready to fight and provide defense support to civil authorities when required. Second, the Army needed increased agility, flexibility and capability to meet joint force requirements for full-spectrum operations (offense, defense, stability, civil support) across the range of military operations (peacetime military engagement, small-scale contingencies, general war). During the Cold War, the Army was primarily organized, trained and equipped to defeat traditional threats in conventional campaigns. The 15,000-strong division was the primary combined arms unit, but since 1991 joint force requirements typically called for smaller units with more versatile capabilities. Additionally, Army brigades needed organic capabilities previously found at corps and division levels meet the challenge of irregular warfare in non-linear, complex environments. The Army's division-based structure made task organization for continuous expeditionary operations more difficult and decreased the readiness of units left behind that were stripped of Soldiers and equipment. Third, the Army needed greater campaign-quality depth to conduct a continuous rotation of forces to achieve strategic objectives over time. The 33 former maneuver brigades in the AC and the 15 enhanced separate brigades readily available in the RC would be insufficient to meet the current operational demand and preserve the All-Volunteer Force. Fourth, the Army needed to improve strategic responsiveness to support rapid joint force power projection in austere environments, but still remain dominant in early-entry operations. Light infantry brigades were deployable but lacked mobility, lethality and survivability. Heavy armored brigades were mobile, lethal and survivable, but were not rapidly deployable. Equally important, the Army's culture and leader development programs needed to adapt to the new strategic environment.

For over 230 years, the Army has adapted to meet new challenges and defend the Nation. In the late 1990's, Army Chief of Staff General Eric Shinseki articulated the compelling need to transform the Army's concepts, organizations, technology and people to meet the challenges of the 21st century. Army transformation seeks to provide the joint force with strategically responsive landpower that can achieve decisive outcomes across the spectrum of conflict from peacekeeping to warfighting. The joint force needs the capability to negate anti-access strategies by deploying to multiple points of entry, operate in remote areas with unimproved infrastructure, leverage the synergy of a joint network-enabled force, maneuver to positions of advantage in distributed non-linear battlespace, attack with joint and Army precision fires, and destroy the enemy in close combat. The Stryker Brigade Combat Team, optimized for small-scale contingencies, is the interim force design to achieve these capabilities. Future Combat Systems (FCS) is the centerpiece of the Army's modernization strategy to achieve the strategically responsive, full-spectrum dominant future modular force.

Army Chief of Staff General Peter Schoomaker accelerated Army transformation in 2003 to improve the capabilities of Soldiers and enable the joint force to create conditions for enduring success in Afghanistan and Iraq. Defining the central ideas of evolving Army transformation in the article *Serving a Nation at War*, General Schoomaker described the campaign-quality of an army as "not only its ability to win decisive combat operations, but also its ability to sustain those operations for as long as necessary, adapting them as required to unpredictable and often profound changes in the context and character of the conflict. The Army's preeminent challenge is to reconcile expeditionary agility and responsiveness with the staying power, durability and adaptability to carry a conflict to a victorious conclusion no matter what form it eventually takes." The joint mindset embraces joint interdependence, the purposeful reliance on service capabilities to maximize their total complementary and reinforcing effects, while minimizing their relative vulnerabilities. The Army optimizes its forces, capabilities and organizations to support joint operating, integrating and functional concepts. The expeditionary mindset accepts the reality of persistent conflict and the probability of deployments to fight on arrival against adaptive enemies in austere, complex environments. Soldiers with a joint and expeditionary mindset are confident they are organized, trained and equipped to go anywhere in the world, at any time, in any environment, against any adversary, to accomplish their assigned missions.

The Army views transformation as the continuous evolution of capabilities over time from the current to future force. The current force is today's Operational Army. The future force is the strategically responsive, campaign-quality Army, dominant across the range of military operations and fully integrated within the joint, interagency and multi-national security framework. Transforming the Army at war requires a carefully managed balance between sustaining and enhancing the capabilities of the current force to win the war today, while investing in capabilities for the future force to meet the complex and unpredictable challenges of tomorrow. In fact, these two strategic activities are mutually supporting and fully integrated. For example, the Army will spin-out mature technologies from the Future Combat Systems as soon as they are ready to enhance joint ground forces in combat. Simultaneously, the operational experience gained by the current force will improve the development of FCS, the Army's principal modernization program that will enable the future force to fight as a fully integrated partner on the joint team.

Yet Army transformation is more than new technology—it's about Soldiers, units and warfighting. The Army Campaign Plan directs the comprehensive strategic change of the Operational Army and the Generating Force, including the following complementary and fully integrated major objectives:

- **Doctrine**: Develop concepts and doctrine to guide force development, which include *The Army in Joint Operations: The Army's Future Force Capstone Concept (2015-2024)*, FM 3-0 *Full-Spectrum Operations*, FM 3-24 *Counterinsurgency*, and the doctrine to employ the Army Modular Force.

- **Organization**: Implement the Army Modular Force to reorganize the Operational Army into modular theater armies, theater support structure, corps and division headquarters, brigade combat teams, and multi-functional and functional support brigades based on common organizational designs for AC and RC units.

- **Training**: Implement Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN), a cyclic training and readiness process that generates modular expeditionary forces tailored to joint force requirements. ARFORGEN supports the Army's goal to synchronize strategic planning, resourcing and execution to meet rotational and contingency requirements more effectively and efficiently. ARFORGEN requires the Generating Force to adapt its processes to resource and sustain the Operating Force on a cyclic basis.

- **Materiel**: Reset the Force to ensure readiness for current and future operations. Sustain the Rapid Fielding Initiative (RFI) and Rapid Equipping Force (REF) to equip Soldiers properly for combat operations. Implement Network Enabled Battle Command solutions to support current joint operations. Develop the Integrated Network Architecture and resource plan for LandWarNet, the Army's contribution to the Global Information Grid (GIG). Develop FCS and field FCS BCTs. Spin-out mature FCS capabilities directly into the current force.

- **Leadership and Education**: Instill the Warrior Ethos in every Soldier. Develop pentathletes—innovative, adaptive leaders who are full-spectrum warriors, confident and competent in the complex, uncertain operating environment. Leverage lessons learned in combat, counter-insurgency, stability and reconstruction operations. Expand cultural awareness in military education and enhance foreign language training.

- **Personnel**: Implement unit focused stability (lifecycle manning) to improve training, cohesion and combat effectiveness in units. Implement force stabilization to improve predictability for Soldiers and their families. Apply better business practices to free resources for pressing operational needs and to develop leaders who practice the principles of continuous improvement.

- **Facilities**: Implement the Global Defense Posture Realignment (GDPR) and Base Realignment and Closure Commission (BRAC) directed unit moves.

Executing this comprehensive transformation during wartime is a dynamic process. The Army must integrate transformation activities with the strategic posture to support current operations and its capabilities-based program and budget as shown in figure 1. This requires the Army to adjudicate risk and refine its transformation plan on a continuous basis. The Army must address several priorities: the size of the Army to meet strategic requirements; the wartime costs of equipment reset and unit readiness; the need to transform and modernize the force; and taking care of Soldiers and their families. While transformation during wartime is dynamic, it is nevertheless essential to improve the capabilities of Soldiers, support the combatant commanders and preserve the All-Volunteer Force in the long war against terrorism.

Army Campaign Plan Framework



Fig 1. Army Campaign Plan Framework.

The following sections of this report will show how Army transformation provides relevant and ready landpower with increased capabilities to combatant commanders, today and in the future. Army transformation puts the Army on a wartime posture, reducing the operational risk accepted under tiered readiness to form whole, cohesive units that are fully manned, equipped and trained to accomplish their assigned mission. With additional resources, the Army will grow from 70 to 76 BCTs and approximately 225 support brigades to build strategic depth, meet the joint force requirements for continuous operations and maintain the quality of the All-Volunteer Force. The Army Modular Force improves the strategic flexibility to tailor modular expeditionary forces to meet joint force requirements on a “plug and play” basis. It increases unit capabilities and force structure required to conduct full-spectrum operations in today’s complex environments. It enables theater army, corps and division headquarters to meet the increased demand for joint force headquarters. The Future Combat Systems will improve strategic responsiveness while preserving full-spectrum dominance by striking the optimum balance of deployability, mobility, lethality and survivability. Army Force Generation implements a cyclic training and readiness process to generate modular expeditionary forces tailored to joint force requirements for continuous operations. Generating Force and business transformation improve the Army’s ability to man, train, and equip Army operating forces during a period of limited resources and increased operational demand. Ultimately, Army transformation produces the optimum mix of land capabilities for the joint force commander, manages operational risk prudently, and is both affordable and essential for the Nation to win the war today and prepare for an uncertain future.

THE ARMY MODULAR FORCE

The Army Modular Force reorganizes the Operational Army into modular theater armies, theater support structure, corps and division headquarters, brigade combat teams, and multi-functional and functional support brigades based on standardized organizational designs for the AC and RC. The Army is reorganizing from a division-based to a modular brigade-based force to achieve three primary goals:

- Increase the number of available brigade combat teams (BCT) to meet operational requirements while maintaining combat effectiveness that is equal to or better than previous divisional brigades.
- Create brigade-size combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) formations of common organizational designs that can be easily tailored to meet the varied demands of the geographic combatant commanders and reduce the complexities of joint planning and execution.
- Redesign organizations to perform as integral parts of the joint force, making them more effective across the range of military operations and enhancing their ability to contribute to joint, interagency and multinational efforts.



Fig. 2. The Brigade-Based Modular Force.

This section describes the modular organization designs and capabilities, reviews the current status of building modular capabilities, explains how the Army Modular Force improves operational support to combatant commanders, and addresses specific questions about capabilities, cost, affordability and risk.

Modular Organizational Designs and Capabilities

Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs). The Chief of Staff of the Army established three minimum criteria for designing modular BCTs: (1) be as capable as current units; (2) be easier to deploy than current units; and (3) allow the Army to build additional maneuver brigades within Army end strength. The Army leveraged existing transformation analysis to approve modular organizational designs that could be readily implemented to support on-going joint operations. The Army assumed acceptable risk in the near term with these organizational designs knowing they could be refined over time based on operational lessons learned, unit feedback and follow-on analysis.

When the Army began to convert units to modular designs in April 2004, it had 14 heavy divisions, 2 light divisions, 1 airborne division, 1 air assault division, and a number of independent separate maneuver brigades. Each division was different from the other, resulting in 71 brigades of 17 variant designs. Each maneuver brigade had different capabilities and support requirements, making it extremely difficult to combine different brigades and headquarters on a "plug and play" rotational basis. The 15,000-strong division was designed to fight as a complete unit, task organizing brigades with additional capabilities from divisional assets as shown in figure 3. The division was optimized to defeat traditional enemies in conventional campaigns. Since 1991, however, joint force requirements typically called for the Army to deploy more versatile brigade-size formations. The division-based force had three significant disadvantages deploying brigade-size units on a routine basis: (1) it complicated the ability to task organize different types of brigades in one headquarters; (2) it degraded the readiness of divisional units left behind; and (3) it compromised the Army's ability to support rotational requirements for continuous joint operations. The Army Modular Force will organize, train and equip BCTs as they will deploy and fight on the joint team.



Fig. 3. Brigade vs. Modular BCT Organization.

The BCT is the largest fixed maneuver organization in the Army and the "building block" of larger modular formations. The BCT conducts full spectrum operations in battles and engagements as a cohesive combined-arms team. Any BCT can be attached to any division, corps or army headquarters without extensive augmentation and task organization because it has the baseline organic combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) necessary to conduct full-spectrum operations. Army commanders may still task organize additional combat maneuver, CS and CSS modular units to augment or support the BCT if required to accomplish the mission. As shown in figure 4, the Army approved three standardized designs for both the AC and RC: the Heavy BCT (HBCT), Infantry BCT (IBCT) and Stryker BCT (SBCT).



Fig. 4. Modular Organizational Designs for Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs).

In addition to the organic CS/CSS capabilities, the HBCT and IBCT include two combat maneuver battalions and a reconnaissance squadron. The combined arms battalion in the HBCT has 2 armor and 2 infantry companies. The infantry battalion in the IBCT has 3 infantry companies and 1 weapons company. The SBCT includes three maneuver infantry battalions, each with 3 infantry companies, and a reconnaissance squadron. The reconnaissance squadron in each BCT has 3 reconnaissance troops. Brigade commanders have confirmed the value of the brigade-level reconnaissance squadron in combat. These designs provide the modular HBCT and IBCT with 11 maneuver companies and the SBCT with 12 maneuver companies compared to 10 maneuver companies in the previous brigade organizations. The color-coded comparisons in figure 5 show how the Army is increasing organic "boots on the ground," (i.e., dismounted front-line Soldiers in squads who conduct operations in close combat) in the modular BCT organizational designs.

Brigade Comparisons	Army of Excellence				Army Modular Force			
	Force XXI Armor Brigade	Force XXI Mech Bde	Light Infantry Brigade	Airborne & Air Assault Brigade	Heavy BCT	Infantry BCT	Stryker BCT	FCS BCT
Platoon Design	3 x 9	3 x 9	3 x 9 + 4 Hvy Wpn Tm	3 x 9 + 9 Wpns Sqd	3 x 9	3 x 9 + 9 Wpns Sqd	3 x 9 + 7 Wpns Sqd	3 x 9 + 9 Wpns Sqd
Infantry in Squads	243	486	729	729	324	486	729	540
Weapons Squad / Team	0	0	108	243	0	162	189	162
Antiarmor Sections	0	0	117	0	0	0	0	0
Infantry Snipers	0	0	0	0	20	27	48	9
Dismounted Bn Scouts	60	60	45	45	30	36	45	99
Dismounted Bde Recon	30	30	0	0	90	108	72	0
Engineer Sappers	0	0	0	0	96	48	72	0
MP Soldiers in Squads	0	0	0	0	39	39	0	0
Asslt Wpns Squads	0	0	0	0	0	96	0	0
MI HUMINT	0	0	0	0	12	12	36	0
Boots on the Ground	**333**	**576**	**999**	**1017**	**611**	**1014**	**1191**	**810**

Fig. 5. Organic “Boots on the Ground” in BCT Organizational Designs.

The Army has increased other capabilities in the modular BCTs to conduct full-spectrum joint operations in today’s complex environments. For example, the organic reconnaissance squadron provides 378 Soldiers and a mix of armored and tactical wheeled vehicles to increase the quality and quantity of information in stability and counter-insurgency operations. The organic military intelligence company provides the BCT with a dedicated Human Intelligence (HUMINT) capability. The military intelligence company has brigade-level Small Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (SUAV) and Trojan Spirit to reach-back to national intelligence and provide all-source analysis forward. The organic signal company is equipped with increased network capabilities including the Joint Network Node (JNN) to enhance joint connectivity. There are increased network-enabled battle command capabilities throughout the brigade organizations, including Future Battle Command Brigade and Below (FBCB2). The organic fires battalion in the BCT has Q-36 and/or Q-37 Firefinder Radar, and Q-48 Lightweight Counter-Mortar Radar (LCMR), to improve force protection against enemy rocket and mortar attacks. The brigade support battalion has capabilities to conduct support operations, including humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. There are new brigade-level battlestaff officers to plan and conduct civil affairs, psychological, public affairs and information operations. Proving their worth in Afghanistan and Iraq, these additional capabilities in the modular BCT are essential to conduct full-spectrum operations in complex environments.

Integrating Future Combat Systems in Modular BCTs. We face adaptive enemies unconstrained by the law of war who employ a full range of conventional and asymmetric tactics in complex environments. This challenge highlights Army vulnerabilities today and makes Army modernization a national imperative. The Army's modernization strategy centers on the Future Combat Systems to fill current and future capability gaps in agility, lethality, survivability, and sustainability across the full spectrum of operations.

For example, one current force capability gap is fully integrated, joint network-enabled battle command. While the Army Battle Command Systems (ABCS) significantly improved situational awareness compared to paper maps and "sticky" unit labels, they were developed as individual systems. As a result, these functional "stovepipes" make it difficult for Soldiers to integrate information. Current systems have no real-time enemy force capability that can be widely distributed across the network. Sensor information is linked "point to point." The enemy situation is still analyst-constructed in a single classified system that cannot be readily shared at the Soldier level. Instead, analysts must translate the enemy situation into the brigade-level maneuver control system (MCS) and translate it again into FBCB2 to reach the Soldier. This sacrifices the speed and quality of shared information, resulting in lost opportunities to defeat adaptive enemies in complex environments.

One reason the Army needs FCS is to improve "intelligence-operations fusion" and seize more opportunities to defeat adaptive enemies in irregular warfare. FCS will fully integrate C4ISR systems with enhanced analytical tools and real time sensor-shooter linkages between echelons. FCS will improve the capability of units to achieve shared situational understanding, avoid traps, act faster, leverage joint capabilities and synchronize combat power to create the desired effects. For the logistician, FCS provides the capability to track, access and drill-down to the content level of detail of deployment and distribution information world-wide across service and agency boundaries, thus helping to ensure continuous sustainment across noncontiguous air, land and sea lines of communications. Contrasting the ABCS and FCS networks, the difference is like integrating incompatible applications on Windows, MAC and LINUX operating systems over 56Kbs dialup, compared to one common application on one operating system leveraging 24 Mbps bandwidth. We will fight better and faster with FCS, providing Soldiers and leaders with decisive advantages.

In 2008, the Army will begin to spin-out Future Combat Systems to the Army Evaluation Task Force. In 2010, the Army will begin to field mature spin-out capabilities to enhance the lethality, protection and C4ISR capabilities of joint ground forces. This includes the modular BCTs and potentially Marine Corps regiments and Special Operations Forces. The first FCS spin-out will include the Non Line-of-Sight Launcher (N-LOS) System, Urban and Tactical Unattended Ground Sensors (UGS), and network capabilities that link sensors to the battle command systems. N-LOS is a networked precision attack capability to destroy moving and stationary targets including armored vehicles at a range of 40 kilometers during day, night, and adverse weather conditions. UGS are sensors that can detect enemy personnel and vehicles in both urban and open

terrain, providing imagery through the network to improve lethality and force protection. Subsequent FCS spin-out capabilities include the Active Protective System (APS), Class I Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, Small Unmanned Ground Vehicle (SUGV), and the full FCS network and improved applications down to Soldier level. The Army's operational analysis shows these FCS capabilities will increase the combat effectiveness of joint ground forces and reduce American casualties.

By accelerating the *organizational* transformation in the Army Modular Force, the Army has already prepared for the *materiel* modernization of the Army with FCS. The FCS BCT is built around a family of advanced, networked, manned and unmanned, air and ground-based maneuver, fires, maneuver support and sustainment systems. Striking the optimum balance of expeditionary agility and staying power, the Army needs the FCS BCT to execute these key operational ideas:

- ***Shaping and Entry Operations*** to shape regional security conditions and seize the initiative, using multiple entry points to overcome enemy anti-access actions, fight on arrival, enhance surprise and produce multiple dilemmas for the enemy.
- ***Operational Maneuver from Strategic Distances*** using advanced joint lift platforms not dependent on improved ports to deploy modular expeditionary forces tailored to joint mission requirements and close the gap between early-entry and follow-on forces.
- ***Intratheater Operational Maneuver*** by ground, sea and air to extend the reach of the joint force commander, exploit opportunities and create dislocating and disintegrating effects on the enemy's force.
- ***Decisive Maneuver*** by conducting simultaneous distributed operations, controlling the operational tempo, and directly attacking key enemy capabilities and centers of gravity.
- ***Concurrent and Subsequent Stability Operations*** to secure and perpetuate the results of decisive maneuver during the campaign and "win the peace" once enemy forces are defeated.
- ***Distributed Support and Sustainment*** to provide continuous sustainment of committed forces and maintain freedom of action even in austere environments with the smallest feasible deployed logistics footprint.
- ***Network-Enabled Battle Command*** to facilitate shared situational understanding needed to self-synchronize and apply joint and Army capabilities to achieve desired effects.

FCS is the essential element of the Army's modernization strategy to fight as an integral part of the strategically responsive, full-spectrum dominant joint team.

Multi-Functional Support Brigades. The Army is reorganizing tactical capabilities outside the BCT into standardized, modular, multi-functional and functional support brigades. The multi-functional brigades can be tailored with the right combination of modular battalions and companies required to support the mission. The five multi-functional support brigades enhance Army, joint and multi-national operations through the following core missions.

- **Combat Aviation Brigade**: Plan, prepare, execute and assess aviation and combined arms operations to support the division and BCT scheme of maneuver to find, fix, and destroy enemy forces at the decisive time and place.



- **Fires Brigade**: Plan, prepare, execute and assess combined arms operations to provide close support and precision strike for Army, joint and multi-national forces by employing joint and organic fires and capabilities.



- **Combat Support Brigade (Maneuver Enhancement)**: Enable and enhance the full dimensional protection and freedom of maneuver of a supported Army, joint and multinational headquarters by shaping, leveraging or mitigating the effects of the operational environment at the tactical and operational levels. Augment maneuver and support brigades with functional assets to optimize the tailored capabilities of those organizations and enhance force application, protection, and focused logistics across multiple areas of operation. It can provide a headquarters to command and control an assigned area of operations including maneuver forces.



- **Battlefield Surveillance Brigade:** Conduct reconnaissance, surveillance, and intelligence operations to enable the Army, joint or multi-national commander to focus joint combat power and effects with precision to support current and future operations throughout the area of operation simultaneously.



- **Sustainment Brigade**: Plan, coordinate, synchronize, monitor and control CSS operations within assigned area of operations. Coordinate for Host Nation Support and contracting services. Provide support to Army, joint, and multinational forces and other government agencies as directed.



Functional Support Brigades. Functional support brigades are an essential component of the Army Modular Force and enhance Army, joint and multi-national operations by planning, preparing, executing and assessing specific support functions. As a general rule, functional support brigades are assigned or attached to a theater-level command or Army headquarters to support theater-wide operational requirements. Functional support brigades provide command and control to subordinate, single-function units which are attached from the pool of available forces. They may be regionally focused and provide reinforcing capabilities to modular BCTs and multi-functional support brigades. The Army Modular Force includes the following functional support brigades: Air Defense (ADA), Engineer (ENG), Military Police (MP), Chemical (CM), Military Intelligence (MI), Signal (SIG), Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD), Quartermaster (QM), Medical (MED), Logistics Regional Support Groups (LOG), Civil Affairs (CA), and Psychological Operations (PSYOP).

Division and Corps Headquarters. The modular division and corps headquarters are the primary tactical and operational warfighting headquarters to command and control Army, joint and multi-national operations in today's complex environments. The Army retained the 3-star corps headquarters to focus on operational-level joint warfighting and provide a more senior commander when required by the combatant commander. Both the division and corps headquarters are capable of serving as a Joint Task Force (JTF), Joint Force Land Component Command (JFLCC) or Army Force (ARFOR) headquarters. Instead of relying on extensive augmentation that strips people from other headquarters that are now preparing to deploy, the Army increased the division and corps staffs to improve the capability to meet the historical requirements in joint manning documents. As a result, these headquarters can plan and conduct Army, joint, and multi-national operations more effectively, including counter-insurgency and stability, security, transition and reconstruction operations (SSTRO). The Army increased and standardized the joint network-enabled battle command capabilities organic to these headquarters. The division and corps headquarters can deploy separate tactical command posts for forced-entry and early-entry operations, and provide reach-back capabilities to minimize footprint in the area of operations. Both headquarters have liaison teams to facilitate joint and multi-national operations.



Fig. 6. Task Organizing the Modular Division and Corps.

The Army Modular Force provides a flexible basis for Army commanders to task organize the right mix of headquarters, BCTs and support brigades to accomplish the assigned mission as shown in figure 6. Depending on the mission, the corps headquarters could exercise operational control of brigades without an intermediate-level division headquarters. Similarly, the army headquarters could exercise operational control of divisions without an intermediate-level corps headquarters. The modular division was designed to command and control up to 6 BCTs, direct Army aviation attack operations and long-range surface fires, conduct a brigade-size air assault, control the civilian population in the area of operations, and employ sustainment brigades to establish forward operating bases and sustain operations. The modular corps and division may operate independently on a line of operations or establish the military conditions in a non-contiguous area of operations required for the successful conclusion of a joint campaign.

Theater Army Headquarters and Support Structure. The theater army is the Army Service Component Command (ASCC) of a geographic combatant command and has both operational and support responsibilities in the area of responsibility (AOR). The Army consolidated most functions performed by former corps and theater army headquarters into a single operational echelon. The theater army performs the Title 10 and administrative control (ADCON) functions of the ARFOR headquarters, including training, supply, personnel administration, maintenance, equipping and military construction. The theater army is the primary vehicle for Army Support to Other Services (ASOS), supporting Army, joint, and multinational forces within the AOR. In major combat operations, where the combatant commander is the Joint Force Commander (JFC), the theater army may be designated the JFLCC and exercise operational control over committed land forces. When required for smaller contingencies, the theater army can provide a JTF-capable deployable headquarters to control forces within a Joint Operations Area (JOA). The ASCC integrates Army forces in the execution of regional security cooperation plans and provides Army planning and support to joint forces, interagency elements, and multinational forces.

Three broad design concepts underlie the theater army organization:

- *Regionally Focused, Globally Networked Organization*. The theater army is not a "pooled" headquarters. It remains the senior Army headquarters assigned to the theater and does not deploy to another area of responsibility.

- *Expeditionary Joint Operations*. The theater army design provides enough capability to enable the initial phase of a joint operation, including a deployable Operational Command Post (OCP). The design provides a flexible platform for Army and joint augmentation in the event of expansion to a major campaign. The theater army is fully capable of planning and conducting full-spectrum joint operations.

- *Regional Army Support and Administrative Control (ADCON)*. The theater army provides ADCON of designated Army forces assigned to the theater. It also supports to special operating forces, joint, interagency, and multinational elements as directed by the combatant commander. The latter is a continuous task performed by the theater army, regardless of whether it is also controlling land forces in a major operation.

To transform the Army into a more agile and adaptable service and increase support to the combatant commanders, the Army directed the realignment of Army headquarters. This decision aligns one theater army (ASCC) reporting directly to each geographic combatant commander as the Army's single point of contact and responsible to the Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA) for the execution of Title 10 and ADCON functions. The Army Modular Force includes the theater support structure tailored to the unique requirements of each combatant command's area of responsibility. Figure 7 shows the general relationship between the combatant commander, the theater army, theater support structure, and the direct reporting units.



Fig. 7. Theater Support Structure Relationships.

The Generating Force consists of those Army organizations whose primary mission is to generate and sustain the Operating Force capabilities for employment by joint force commanders. The Army has established relationships to provide Generating Force support to the theater support structure. The United States Army Space and Missile Defense Command / Army Strategic Command (SMDC/ARSTRAT) supports the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) brigade. The United States Army Materiel Command (AMC) supports the Theater Sustainment Command (TSC). The United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) and United States Army Reserve Command (USARC) support the theater AC and RC Civil Affairs brigades. The United States Army Medical Command (MEDCOM) supports the theater Medical Deployment Support Commands (MDSC). The United States Army Network Enterprise Technology Command (NETCOM)/9th Signal Command (Army) supports the Signal Command (Theater). The United States Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) supports the Military Intelligence Brigade (MIB).

The Army will continue to review and assess Modular Force organizational designs and make changes when necessary and prudent. As stated in initial Modular Force design guidance, the goal was to “get the designs about right and modify based on experience as we field and employ the organizations.”

Status of Building Modular Capabilities

The Army has accelerated the momentum of transformation to increase joint ground force capabilities at the same time the Army has maintained an extremely high operational tempo. As shown in figure 8, the Army executed its highest density of modular transformation activities in FY06. At the end of FY06, the Army had converted 31 AC BCTs and during the year another 4 AC BCTs began modular conversion. The Army National Guard (ARNG) continued modular conversion of 7 BCTs begun in FY05 and started the conversion of 9 more BCTs in FY06 for a total of 16 BCTs converting. Through FY06, a total of 45 multi-functional support brigades and 86 functional support brigades were converting across all components. During FY07, the AC will have a total of 35 BCTs converted and another 3 BCTs converting. The ARNG will begin modular conversion of 9 more BCTs for a total of 25 BCTs converting. At the end of FY07, an additional 12 multi-functional support brigades will be converted, increasing the total to 57 brigades across all components. During FY07, the functional support brigades increased in the AC by 4, the USAR by 5, and the ARNG by 6, for a total of 101 brigades across all components. Modifications to the Generating Force will increase the efficiency of support provided to the operating force. The training base will transform to perform service Title 10 and executive agent functions more efficiently. Further efficiencies will be achieved through conversion of military positions to civilian positions to reduce the number of Soldiers in the Generating Force.

	Capability	Modular Conversion			
		E-Date thru FY06	E-Date FY07	E-Date FY08-13	Total
AC	Brigade Combat Teams (BCT)	35	3	4	***42***
	Multi-Functional Support Brigades	21	9	7	***37 ****
	Functional Support Brigades	34	4	1	***39***
	Subtotal	***90***	***16***	***12***	***118***
ARNG	Brigade Combat Teams (BCT)	***16 *****	9	3	***28***
	Multi-Functional Support Brigades	21	2	23	***46 ******
	Functional Support Brigades	19	6	7	***32 ******
	Subtotal	***56***	***17***	***33***	***106***
USAR	Multi-Functional Support Brigades	3	2	6	***11***
	Functional Support Brigades	33	0	14	***47***
	Subtotal	***36***	***2***	***20***	***58***
Army	Brigade Combat Teams (BCT)	***51 *****	***12***	***7***	***70***
	Multi-Functional Support Brigades	***45***	***13***	***36***	***94***
	Functional Support Brigades	***86***	***10***	***22***	***118***
	Total	**182**	**35**	**65**	**282**

E-Date (effective date) reflects conversion to modular design; does not represent readiness or availability.

* Additional AC Fires Brigade increases total support brigades from 75 to 76 (37 multi-functional; 39 functional)

** Represents ARNG BCT acceleration for conversion to modular organizational designs; manning, training and equipping completed over time (up to four years)

*** Number and Mix of support brigades dependent upon on-going collaborative ARNG Rebalance initiative

Fig. 8. Status of Building Modular Capabilities (Not Including Growth).

The Army continuously analyzes its strategic requirements and adjusts its force structure to provide the required capabilities to the joint force. For example, the Army is rebalancing so the AC has the essential capabilities to conduct the first 30 days of expeditionary operations without reliance on the RC. The Army is restructuring AC and RC forces to increase the capability to conduct stability operations and irregular warfare. The Army is accelerating the modular conversion of two AC BCTs and making every BCT available to deploy and support the joint force. The Army is developing options to increase the size of the Army to build strategic depth and meet the enduring operational demand for Army forces.

In accordance with the 2006 QDR force planning construct, the Army planned to build 70 BCTs and more than 200 support brigades as shown in figure 9. Because of the increased and enduring operational demand, the Army is now planning to increase its end-strength to sustain current operations, prepare for future contingencies and preserve the All-Volunteer Force. With additional resources, the Army will grow to include 76 BCTs (i.e., 48 AC BCTs and 28 ARNG BCTs) and approximately 225 support brigades. The Army will continue to update the Army Campaign Plan to execute these force structure decisions as they are made.

	AC	ARNG	USAR	TOTAL
Force Application				
BCTs (Total)	**42**	**28**		**70**
Heavy BCT (HBCT)	18	6		24
Armored Cav Reg't (ACR)	1			1
Stryker BCT (SBCT)	6	1		7
Infantry BCT (IBCT)	17	21		38
Fires Brigade	**6**	**7**		**13**
Combat AVN BDE (Total)	**11**	**8**		**19**
CAB (Heavy)	5	2		7
CAB (Medium)	4			4
CAB (Light)	2			2
CAB (Expeditionary)		6		6
Theater Aviation BDE	1	5	1	7
Theater Airfireld Ops Group	1	1		2
Information OPNs Groups	2	2		4
Special Forces Group (ABN)	5	2		7
Civil Affairs Brigade	1		8	9
PSYOP Group	1		2	3
Ranger Regiment	1			1
Special OPNs AVN Regiment	1			1
Protection				
Air Defense Artillery BDE	4	2		6
Ground Midcourse Def Bde		1		1
Combat Support Brigade (ME)	**3**	**15**	**2**	**20**
Engineer BDE	4	6	4	14
Military Police BDE	6	3	3	12
Criminal Investigation Det.	2			2
Chemical Brigade	1	1	1	3
Focused Logistics				
Sustainment Brigade	**13**	**9**	**8**	**30**
Sustain BDE (Special OPNS)	1			1
Ordnance Group	2	1		3
Quartermaster Groups	1		3	4
TASMG		4		4
Medical Brigades	4		10	14
Army Field Support Brigades	7	1	1	9

	AC	ARNG	USAR	TOTAL
Battlespace Awareness				
Military Intelligence BDE	10			10
Electronic Warfare Group	2			2
Battlefield Surveillance BDE	**3**	**2**		**5**
Command and Control: Brigades				
Signal Brigades	7	2	1	10
Space Brigade	1			1
Command and Control: Headquarters				
ASCCs (Total)	10			10
Theater Army HQs	**5**			**5**
Functional ASCCs	4			4
Non-modular army HQs (EUSA)	1			1
Theater Subordinate CMDs	9	3	12	24
AAMDC	2	1		3
Aviation Command		1	1	2
CBRNE Command	1			1
Civil Affairs Command			4	4
Engineer Command			2	2
Expeditionary Sust. CMD	3	2	5	10
MDSC	2		2	4
Military Police Command		1	1	2
Signal Command			2	2
Theater Sustainment CMD	2	1	1	4
Information Operations	1			1
Corps Headquarters	**3**	**0**		**3**
Division Headquarters	**10**	**8**		**18**
Force Management				
Financial Management Center	2		4	6
Regional Support Groups		17	25	42
HR Sustainment Center	2		2	4
Training				
Generating Force BDE/RGT/GRP	4			4
Training Brigades (Schools)	7+			7+
Brigade (Training Support)			17	17
Sim. Exercise GRP (BCST)			5	5

Fig. 9. Army Modular Force Structure by Joint Capability Areas (Not Including Growth).

Improving Operational Capability to support Combatant Commanders

The modular force improves the Army's operational capability to support the joint force commander in several important ways.

The Army Modular Force improves unit capabilities to conduct full-spectrum joint operations and address the 2006 QDR priorities. The Army is increasing joint C4ISR and organic Combat/CS/CSS capabilities in modular BCTs to conduct simultaneous offensive, defensive, and stability or civil support operations within non-linear areas of operations. This is the reality of land warfare in Afghanistan and Iraq. On any given day, a BCT may conduct counter-insurgency and civil affairs operations to support the host nation government; foreign internal defense with partnership units; combat patrols to secure areas; raids to identify and capture insurgents and terrorists; defense of critical civilian infrastructure like voting stations; and humanitarian assistance to relieve suffering. Because there are no front lines in today's battlespace, the Army will equip all units including CS/CSS with force protection, night vision goggles, crew served weapons, radios and other critical items. The Army is increasing 100,000 spaces of force structure including civil affairs, military police, engineer, and sustainment capabilities, which can be task organized within the BCT or support brigades. Additionally, the Army has increased other capabilities to address the four priorities in the 2006 QDR as shown in figure 10.

Defeating Terrorist Extremism

- Recognition of the "long war" and rotation base
- Expansion of Army multi-purpose and special operations capacity
- Enhancements of multi-purpose force capabilities for irregular warfare
- Transformation of RC from a strategic reserve to an operational force
- Security, stability, transition, and reconstruction (SSTR) operations as a core capability
- Enhancement of language skills, cultural awareness
- Increasing human intelligence (HUMINT)
- Training, mentoring, equipping, and advising indigenous forces

Countering WMD

- Increasing render safe capabilities and capacity
- JTF for WMD Elimination

Shaping Choices of Countries at Strategic Crossroads

- Continuous modernization
- Operational maneuver and sustainment of ground forces at strategic distances
- Expanding alliances, developing new partnerships
- Expanding foreign area officer (FAO) programs
- Theater security cooperation and engagement activities, including joint training exercises, senior staff talks, and officer and foreign internal defense training

Defending the Homeland in Depth

- Rebalancing capabilities (AC/RC)
- Interagency and international partnerships
- Investments in bio-defense research

Fig. 10. Increasing Army Capability to address 2006 QDR Priorities.

***The Army Modular Force improves strategic flexibility to tailor modular expeditionary forces to meet joint force requirements*.** The "menu" of modular headquarters, BCTs and support brigades provides a more flexible start point to simplify joint planning and force tailoring to meet requirements. Any BCT or support brigade may be attached to any army, corps or division headquarters on a "plug and play" basis without extensive task organization and augmentation. This was not possible with the previous division-based organizations. To operationalize this initiative, the joint force headquarters should define the operational requirement in terms of capability. The theater army, in coordination with Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA) and United States Forces Command (FORSCOM), the Army's "Global Force Provider" supporting the United States Joint Forces Command (USFJCOM), determines the types of modular units to provide the required capability. The Army is currently working through its service component commands to update the combatant commands' war plans and requests for forces to leverage modular unit capabilities.

***The Army Modular Force improves unit readiness and size of the deployable force pool*.** The Army Modular Force equips all AC and RC units to their Modified Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE) based on common, standardized designs. The Army has been allocating resources in its base budget to fill the "holes in the force" and reduce the equipment shortages in AC and RC units. Fully resourcing the growth of the modular force will increase the deployable force pool from 33 former brigades to 48 BCTs in the AC, and from 15 readily available enhanced separate brigades to 28 BCTs in the RC, over the period FY 2004-2013. This increase in the size of the deployable force pool is essential to build strategic depth, meet the enduring operational demand and preserve the All-Volunteer Force in persistent conflict.

***The Army Modular Force improves the capability to support requirements for Joint Force Headquarters*.** The Secretary of Defense directed the military departments to improve the process to generate and support JTFs. The DoD objective is to be capable of deploying to conduct joint operations across the entire spectrum of missions within 10 days. The data from U.S. Joint Forces Command shows the number of JTFs has increased, the duration of JTF employment has increased, the Army has led most of the JTFs, the Army has provided most of the people for JTFs, and the use of JTFs can occur quickly with little warning time for activation and training. For example, the Army was assigned to man 2,400 of the 3,900 approved billets for all operating JTFs in 2004. Such JTF requirements are the norm, not the exception. Therefore, the Army increased the number and manning of deployable army, corps and division headquarters capable of serving as a JTF, JFLCC or ARFOR in the Army Modular Force. The extensive use of individual augmentees to meet the personnel requirements of joint manning documents failed to meet the DoD objective and increased operational risk for two reasons. First, it institutionalized a short-notice "pick-up game" instead of training the headquarters for its joint mission in complex environments well before deployment. Second, it stripped personnel from headquarters that are next to deploy to an active theater such as Afghanistan and Iraq. The modular army, corps and division headquarters are joint capable headquarters—organized, trained and equipped to meet the increased demand for JTFs in the new security environment.

The Army Modular Force improves strategic responsiveness to achieve Joint Swiftness Goals. To prevent the United States from building up overwhelming combat power, future enemies could seize the infrastructure necessary to deploy forces. To counter this anti-access strategy, DoD has made numerous improvements to joint power projection. The Joint Swiftness Goals are to defeat the efforts of any potential enemy within 10 days after the beginning of a conflict, defeat that enemy fully within the next 30 days, and be prepared to engage a second potential enemy 30 days after that. The Stryker and FCS BCTs, along with AC/RC rebalancing, will improve the joint force capability to project 3 BCTs in 10 days to multiple ports of entry and conduct successful early-entry combat operations soon after arrival in theater.

Questions about the Army Modular Force

The Congress and some external studies have raised questions about the capabilities, risk, cost and affordability of the Army's transformation plan.

Why did the Army change from 77 to 70 BCTs? In 2004, the Army planned to build a total of 77 BCTs, with 43 BCTs in the AC and 34 BCTs in the ARNG. This force mix would enable the Army to supply 20 BCTs to meet steady-state requirements. The 2006 QDR force planning construct defined steady-state and surge requirements in three objective areas: Defend the Homeland; Prevail in the War on Terror and Conduct Irregular Operations; and Conduct and Win Conventional Campaigns. The supporting operational analysis determined the Army requirement to supply 18-19 BCTs under steady-state conditions and to surge an additional 18-19 BCTs if required. As a result, the Army changed its plan to build 42 BCTs in the AC and 28 BCTs in the ARNG. The Army planned to use the manpower savings from the reduction in BCTs to increase Combat/ CS/CSS structure and relieve stress on the high-demand, low-density units and Soldiers. A "balanced force" with the necessary CS/CSS structure is essential to conduct continuous operations, including defense support to civil authorities such as humanitarian assistance, disaster relief and consequence management.

Recent decisions to expand the size of the Army reflect the clear recognition of the President, the Secretary of Defense and the Congress of the importance of joint ground forces to meet strategic requirements and the increasing stress on Soldiers and families as a result of the enduring operational demand. The Army is developing plans to grow to include 76 BCTs (i.e., 48 AC BCTs and 28 RC BCTs) and approximately 225 support brigades. This expanded deployable force pool would build strategic depth and enable the Army to provide a continuous supply 20-21 BCTs with enablers. However, the Army must avoid the dangers of a "hollow Army," which results from maintaining large numbers of units on paper that in reality lack the people, equipment, training and support needed to accomplish their assigned missions. Just as the strength of a rope results from strong bands woven tightly together, the strength of the Army results from whole, cohesive units that are fully manned, equipped, trained and ready to conduct full spectrum operations today—and modernized with the Future Combat Systems to meet the challenges of tomorrow. With timely, adequate and predictable resources, the Army can build the force structure necessary to sustain its commitments with whole, cohesive units that are ready to fight and to support civil authorities.

Why did the Army change from 3 to 2 combined-arms battalions in the modular Heavy and Infantry Brigade Combat Teams? The Army must balance strategic, operational and tactical risk in force design. The Army Modular Force strikes the optimum balance under realistic end-strength, increasing the number of BCTs to preserve the All-Volunteer Force in persistent conflict and meet joint force operational requirements, while maintaining or improving their tactical capabilities.

Based on extensive analysis, the Army concluded that the increased number of maneuver companies in the combined arms battalions, the organic CS/CSS and the increased C4ISR enablers make the BCT as capable as previous brigade designs. Adding a third combined arms battalion would make the BCT more capable than previous designs, but this would increase the cost to resource the HBCT by 585 personnel and $1 billion, and increase the cost to resource the IBCT by 853 personnel and $1.2 billion (in 20 year life cycle costs). A battalion-level comparison by itself does not account for the true strength of the modular designs. Using more accurate company-level metrics, the Army increased the number of maneuver companies from 10 to 11 in the modular BCT. Analysis should consider the full capabilities of the reconnaissance squadron, a third maneuver battalion with 3 ground troops that significantly improve the quantity and quality of information available to the brigade. This value is consistent with Army doctrine that defines the elements of combat power as movement and maneuver, fire support, intelligence, protection, sustainment, command and control, and leadership—all of which are enhanced in the BCT design.

The Army needed to increase the number of BCTs to preserve the All-Volunteer Force and meet the increased operational demand. With only 33 AC brigades in the force pool before modular conversion, the AC deployment ratio (1 unit deployed to 0.4 units training at home station or 1:0.4) would fail to meet the AC planning objective for surge conditions (1:2) given an operational demand of 23 BCTs (see figure 11). Growth to 48 AC BCTs improves the ratio (1:1.1) but not enough to achieve the AC dwell goals. Therefore General Schoomaker warned, “At this pace, without recurrent access to the reserve components through remobilization, we will break the active component.” With growth to 48 AC BCTs and recurrent access to deploy 4 ARNG BCTs, the AC ratio improves (1:1.5) but still falls short of the goal at the current high level of demand.

Deployable Force Pool	Capability of the Deployable Force Pool to meet Operational Demand	Deployment Ratio AC BCTs Deployed : AC BCTs Training
	Without recurrent access to the RC, AC Opertional Demand = 23 BCTs	
33 AC Brigades (Before Modularity)	23 AC Bdes deployed to 10 AC Bdes training at home station	1 : 0.4
42 AC BCTs (With Modularity)	23 AC BCTs deployed to 19 AC BCTs training at home station	1 : 0.8
48 AC BCTs (With Growth)	23 AC BCTs deployed to 25 AC BCTs training at home station	1 : 1.1
	With recurrent access to deploy 4 ARNG BCTs, AC Operational Demand reduces to 19 BCTs	
33 AC Brigades (Before Modularity)	19 AC BCTs deployed to 14 AC BCTs training at home station	1 : 0.7
42 AC BCTs (With Modularity)	19 AC BCTs deployed to 23 AC BCTs training at home station	1 : 1.2
48 AC BCTs (With Growth)	19 AC BCTs deployed to 29 AC BCTs training at home station	1 : 1.5
	AC Planning Objective for Surge Conditions	1 : 2
	AC Planning Objective for Steady-State Conditions	1 : 3

Fig. 11. Comparison of AC BCT Force Pools and Deployment Ratios.

Should the Army build specialized "Peacekeeping Divisions" to conduct stability, support, transition and reconstruction operations? Operational experience supports the Army's view that a combined-arms modular force, fully trained to conduct full-spectrum operations, is more effective in realistic environments and more flexible to meet the range of joint force requirements under realistic end-strength. Brigades in Afghanistan and Iraq need the capability to conduct simultaneous offensive, defensive and stability operations as shown in figure 12. The proportion of these simultaneous operations often changes to reflect the dynamic situation on the ground.



Fig. 12. Simultaneous Full-Spectrum Operations in Iraq.

A "peacekeeping division" consisting of military police, engineers, civil affairs and special operations forces would lack the offensive and defensive capability necessary to achieve and maintain a secure operating environment that enables all instruments of national power to operate effectively. Ideally, the potential capability to conduct offensive operations will deter hostile forces from attacking and reduce the level of violence, as it did the Balkans. Sometimes, the kinetic capability to conduct offensive operations is necessary to secure the population and support the political process, as was the case in Falloujah, Iraq, in 2004 and in Helmund Province, Afghanistan, in 2006.

Instead of building "peacekeeping divisions" that have limited utility outside of permissive environments, the Army Modular Force is based on a proven combined-arms approach to full-spectrum operations in complex environments like Somalia, the Balkans, Afghanistan and Iraq. The Army increased the capability of modular BCTs to conduct stability, security, transition and reconstruction operations (SSTRO). The Army is also converting 100,000 spaces of force structure to build additional military police, transportation, petroleum/water distribution, civil affairs, special forces, psychological operations, and biological detection units. Army commanders can task organize these new modular units in BCTs or support brigades, under the operational control of a modular corps or division headquarters, as required to accomplish the mission. Most importantly, the Army is fully committed to train and develop adaptive leaders and warriors who can operate effectively in today's complex environments. The combined-arms modular force increases the deployable force pool to conduct simultaneous full-spectrum operations and provides safeguards against strategic surprise.

What are the "lessons learned" about the Modular Force in combat? Initial feedback from the division, brigade and battalion commanders who employed modular units in combat indicate that modular BCTs have greater utility across a broad range of military operations than previous designs. Modular BCTs are demonstrating their effectiveness in combat missions and in stability operations. They are better at interacting with other service tactical elements of the joint force. Major General Webster, former Commanding General, 3d Infantry Division, stated that the modular BCT works in combat, noting it "operates as a team" and "has tremendous capability." He also noted the permanent task organization of critical core components eliminated multiple bosses from attached units like engineer, field artillery, and military intelligence. 3d Infantry Division personnel commented that BCTs needed additional earth moving capability, more capability in the armed reconnaissance squadron to "fight for information," and more organic intelligence analysis capability. Major General Turner, former Commanding General, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), noted the significant increase in situational awareness for brigade commanders based on increased battle command systems. 101st Airborne Division feedback also cited leader development as a critical factor for modular forces with the robust BCT and division staffs that are key enablers in a leader intensive environment. Major General Thurman, Commanding General, 4th Infantry Division, noted from Iraq that, "Modularity provides the flexibility for the division commander to allocate combat power." The 4th Infantry Division feedback cited the success of organic combat support and service support elements within modular BCTs. The 4th Infantry Division identified the lack of organic engineer assault breaching and gap crossing capability and the need for greater bandwidth capacity to support battle command systems as areas for improvement. The Army will continue to evaluate lessons learned and apply changes to the modular force designs based on operational experience. Force design updates have addressed the shortcomings cited above along with others identified through the Army's lessons learned processes.

The United States Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) has also identified several other capability gaps and recommendations. TRADOC continues the extensive review of designs and equipping basis of issue plans for crew served weapons, own-the-night, convoy protection, fixed site protection, and unique protection requirements. TRADOC applied recent lessons learned from deployed units to determine changes and additions to unit requirements to protect Soldiers and deployed Army units. TRADOC used recent lessons learned to identify current force gaps in physical site protection from suicide bombers and improvised explosive devices, inadequate C4ISR and navigational capability, and convoy force protection. TRADOC recommended increased machine guns, ring mounts, and thermal sights for CSS units and an interim C4ISR solution for tactical radios based on force protection, operational requirements, and the modularity concept. Finally, TRADOC completed an Adjusted Capabilities Needs Analysis 09-13 that identified Army requirements to support joint required capabilities, assessed how programmed Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, and Facilities solutions support these Army requirements and identified capability gaps.

What is the Army's process to assess and review Modular Force designs?

The Army continues to evaluate all facets of modular force performance in training and in combat operations. The Army has a very responsive process to assess and review modular force doctrine, organization, training, leader development, and battle command requirements. The following integrated processes enable the Army to evaluate proposed changes and make improvements to support the warfighter:

Data Collection Means or Processes to Assess Modular Force Designs:

- "How to Fight" Conference of School Commandants that assesses current force design and doctrine.
- Army Modular Force Education Team (AMFET) informs, educates, and obtains feedback from units prior to their conversion, so they have a better understanding of the various designs and challenges they will face.
- Documentation Assistance and Review Team (DART) helps the commander to fix documentation errors prior to conversion.
- Modular Coordination Cells (MCC) are embedded within transforming units to assist commanders, address concerns and resolve issues.
- Force Design Updates (FDU) change the organizational design of units when justified by operational requirements.
- Modular Force Observation Team (MFOT) observes and evaluates converted units at NTC and JRTC, providing insights that become possible FDUs.
- Collection and Analysis Team (CAAT) observes converted units in combat operations, providing insights on capability gaps, C2, communications and effects.
- Modular Force Design Review (MFDR), directed by the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, is a comprehensive review of the Modular Force designs to identify efficiencies in the designs while maintaining the essence of modularity.
- Total Army Analysis (TAA) develops the requirements and authorizations defining the force structure the Army must build, raise, provision, sustain, maintain, train and resource.

Forums to Assess Progress of Conversion to Modular Formations:

- Force Management Review (FMR) provides the guidance that determines force requirements, allocates resources and evaluates utilization of the resources in TAA.
- Monthly Force Validation Committee (FVC) evaluates the personnel, equipment, sustainment, training readiness, and facilities status of converting or deploying units at brigade level and higher.
- Army Campaign Plan Updates (ACP Updates) are bi-weekly reviews of the transformation execution and decision-making forums. They include the Army Synchronization Meeting (ASM) which systematically reviews the personnel, equipment, sustainment, training readiness, and facilities status of brigade-level and higher units.
- Force Feasibility Review (FFR) enables the Army to create modular MTOEs that are adequately resourced and on a path to meet approved designs. It is a collaborative process with HQDA, TRADOC, AMC, and FORSCOM.

What is the Army's plan for Army Pre-Positioned Stocks (APS)? The Army Campaign Plan directs the Army Materiel Command to reset, modularly convert and sustain APS. These requirements will be resourced in accordance with Army priorities. (Note, for additional detailed information about APS, and equipping and funding the Army Modular Force initiative, please refer to the Army's report in fulfillment of the requirements found in Section 323 of the FY 2007 National Defense Authorization Act.)

How will the Army equip the Modular Force? The Army's objective is a fully manned, trained, and equipped force with comparable structure, equipment and capabilities balanced between the active and reserve components. The Army's construct to equip the modular force is based on three factors: (1) filling existing and new shortages in all modular units, (2) essential modernization to upgrade or replace non-deployable equipment, and (3) modernization of older equipment. Modular force transformation affects the Total Army—Active, Guard and Reserve. As the Army creates modular capabilities, it is rebalancing and restructuring to achieve a more effective force mix between active and reserve forces.

Equipping the modular force is not done in a vacuum. The Army is at war. Since the Army does not have enough equipment to resource every unit to 100 percent of required equipment, the Army must prioritize units for equipping based on assigned missions and their place in the ARFORGEN rotational cycle. Driven by operational requirements, ARFORGEN enables the Army to prioritize and allocate the correct mix of equipment to provide a sustained supply of ready units to meet combatant commander requirements. This process includes United States Northern Command's mission to support homeland security and homeland defense using the Army National Guard as the first military responder. For example, the Army teamed with the National Guard leadership to identify dual use equipment in their "essential ten capabilities" to provide defense support to civil authorities. The Army has fenced more than $21 billion for ground systems procurement and $1.9 billion in aviation equipment in fiscal years 2005 through 2011, a four-fold increase over the prior planning period. In close collaboration with the National Guard, the Army has also fielded over 11,000 pieces of critical equipment to priority hurricane states.

Several factors challenge the Army's ability to provide equipment within the ARFORGEN process. High-demand, low-density items such as up-armored tactical wheeled vehicles, counter-improvised explosive device systems and route clearing vehicles are not available in adequate numbers to equip all non-deployed units. As a result, units that return from the war require training sets that contain these types of items, which are shared by a number of CONUS-based units. These kinds of items are also included in Theater Provided Equipment to ensure each and every unit is fully equipped to conduct combat operations in wartime.

The Army synchronizes equipping the modular force with resetting the force for continuous operations. As units return from the war, they are progressively reset to increasing levels of equipment readiness to redeploy to the war. Reset brings individual pieces of equipment to the same level of readiness that they were prior to deployment

or better. The Army does not reset equipment to obsolete levels. Some equipment, such as the Abrams Tanks and Bradley Fighting Vehicles, will be reset to current levels of modernization. Equipment that is destroyed or is uneconomically repairable is reset through replacement. Equipment reset upon return from deployment is distributed with equipment procured for the modular force in accordance with priorities supporting the war and transforming units to modular design.

The modular force and the Future Combat System (FCS) are two parts of an inseparable whole. Modular conversion is the organizational transformation of the Army; FCS is the materiel modernization of the Army. Although the word "future" is in the program title, FCS is fast becoming a reality today. Operations in Afghanistan and Iraq illustrate that technological and training superiority are critical ingredients of battlefield success and must be sustained. The Army is focusing development efforts on promising FCS technologies and "spinning out" these enhanced capabilities into the current force so that Soldiers retain technological overmatch. Given today's wartime imperative, the Army cannot wait for transformational change and modernization over multiple decades. The Army has a balanced approach to transformation that ensures Soldiers and combatant commanders receive the best possible support and capabilities as soon as we can provide them, now and in the future.

Can the Army afford to reset equipment, implement the modular force initiative and develop the Future Combat Systems? Yes, the Nation can afford to resource the Army to sustain the long war against terrorism, transform the Army to improve the capabilities of Soldiers to defend the Nation, and modernize the Army to break our historic cycle of national unpreparedness. The Office of the Secretary of Defense, Comptroller, projects the 2007 Defense spending will be 3.9% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), continuing a downward trend as shown in figure 13. During World War II, Defense spending was 38% of GDP. From 1968 to 2005, GDP has increased over 300%, yet Defense spending has increased only 62%.



Fig. 13. Defense Spending as % of GDP.

The Army is making every effort to achieve the essential balance between increasing the warfighting capability of the current force and modernizing to achieve the strategically responsive, full-spectrum dominant future force. The Army maintains its clear focus on supporting Soldiers in combat and providing relevant and ready landpower to the combatant commanders. The capabilities and readiness of the current force is the Army's highest priority.

With the strong support of the President and the Congress, the Army acted quickly to resource and improve the warfighting capabilities of the current force. In 2001, the Army began the long war on terror with an equipment and modernization shortfall amounting to $56 billion based on existing structure and requirements. These "holes in the force" were accepted under the concept of tiered readiness and based on the assumption there would be time and funds to resource "late deploying" units properly before deployment. Since Fiscal Year (FY) 2001, the Army has been allocating resources in its base budget and supplemental funding to fill these "holes" and equip all AC and RC units to common organizational designs. The Army is committed to form whole, cohesive units that are fully manned, equipped and trained to accomplish their assigned missions. Army commanders identified an additional $17 billion in operational equipment necessary to increase the force protection and warfighting capabilities of Soldiers in Afghanistan and Iraq. Examples include up-armored tactical wheeled vehicles, improved body armor, improved C4ISR and increased common equipment for Special Operations Forces. The Army continues to resource such equipment for the war in its base budget and supplemental funding. The requirements to reset unit equipment reflect the costs to repair, replace and recapitalize equipment that is worn, damaged or destroyed in the war. These costs are over and above the normal costs to sustain the Army. Currently requested in the FY 2008 supplemental, the Army expects reset costs to be about $13.5 billion a year until the end of operations plus two to three years. The cost to reset equipment will increase with the "plus up" of forces in Iraq and the growth of the Army. Finally, the Army will resource $52.5 billion in its base program from FY 2005 to FY 2011 to build the Army Modular Force. The initial requirement of $28 billion addressed only the BCTs; the subsequent difference is required to transform the rest of the modular force—theater armies, theater commands, corps and division headquarters, and functional and multi-functional support brigades. These initiatives demonstrate the Army's commitment to increase the warfighting capability of the current force and provide relevant and ready landpower to combatant commanders.

The Army has demonstrated flexibility and commitment in resourcing FCS in its base budget. For example, the Army had to make a budget-driven adjustment to the FCS program in the FY 08-13 POM. The Army will preserve the FCS operational concept but adjust the program to reduce costs by $3.3 billion in FY 08-13. The Army will still deliver FCS spin-outs to improve the capabilities of the current force beginning in FY 2008. Modular conversion and FCS combined average less than 10% of the Army's Total Obligation Authority (TOA) over the next 10 years. FCS is the Army's only major modernization program; 160 Army systems have been terminated over the past decade to provide resources for modernization. FCS will improve the warfighting capability of the current force in the long war on terror. FCS is critical to the Army's future force strategy and the Army's continued relevance in the 21st century.

ARMY FORCE GENERATION

To meet joint force requirements for rotational and contingency operations in the new security environment, the Army must adapt from tiered readiness to cyclic readiness. Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) is the structured progression of increased unit readiness over time, resulting in recurring periods of availability of trained, ready, and cohesive units prepared for operational deployment in support of combatant commander requirements. The overarching purpose is to provide combatant commanders and civil authorities with trained and ready units, task organized in modular expeditionary forces tailored to joint mission requirements, with a sustainable campaign capability and depth to conduct continuous full-spectrum operations in persistent conflict. Operational requirements drive the ARFORGEN training and readiness process, which in turn supports the prioritization and synchronization of institutional functions to resource, recruit, organize, man, equip, train, sustain, source, mobilize, and deploy units on a cyclic basis as shown in figure 14. The goal is to achieve a sustained, more predictable posture to generate trained and ready modular forces tailored to joint force requirements more effectively and efficiently.



Fig. 14. Synchronized Strategic Planning, Resourcing and Execution in ARFORGEN.

The Army will implement ARFORGEN in phases. The ARFORGEN Bridging State corresponds to the current surge conditions with compressed deployment cycles. The ARFORGEN Objective State corresponds to the future steady-state security posture, which will permit the full 3-year (AC) and 6 year (RC) deployment cycles.

In the ARFORGEN planning process, the Army will gain a holistic view of global force demands and assess global force availability across six-year planning horizons. The Army will focus units against future missions as early as possible and task organize modular expeditionary forces tailored to joint mission requirements. The Army will refine modular expeditionary forces as operational requirements mature over time. Army units will flow smoothly through the Reset/Train, Ready and Available force pools to meet operational requirements with increased predictability. Units in the Reset/Train force pool will redeploy from operations, receive and stabilize personnel, reset equipment, and conduct individual and collective training culminating in a brigade-level collective training event. Units in the Reset/Train force pool are not ready or available for major combat operations, but should be ready to support civil authorities at all times. Units in the Ready force pool will continue mission-specific collective training and are eligible for sourcing if necessary to meet joint requirements. Units in the Available force pool are at the highest state of training and readiness to meet operational requirements. When the full 3-year (AC) and 6-year (RC) deployment cycles are realized, ARFORGEN will enable a unit to focus on its core mission (e.g., offensive and defensive operations) in Reset/Train and focus on its directed mission (e.g., stability operations) in the Ready force pool. In this way, ARFORGEN supports the goal for Army units to be fully-trained to conduct full-spectrum operations in the future steady-state security posture.

The Army needs recurrent, assured, predictable access to source, mobilize and deploy cohesive RC units to conduct sustained operations. RC units constitute 55% of the Army's force structure and provide essential Combat/CS/CSS capabilities. The AC is not structured to fight alone after the first 30 days of operations. Emphasizing the stress on the Army meeting the joint force requirements in Afghanistan and Iraq, General Schoomaker recently testified that, "As it currently stands, the Army is incapable of generating and sustaining the required forces to wage the Global War on Terror and fulfill all other operational requirements without its components—Active, Guard, and Reserve—surging together." To support global military operations, the Secretary of Defense recently approved RC remobilization authority that includes planning objectives for deployment ratios. This policy includes recognition that current operational demand may require some Active, Guard and Reserve units to redeploy sooner than desired. The Army's deployment planning objectives for AC and RC units under steady-state and surge conditions are shown in figure 15. The remobilization policy will enable the Army to deploy 4-5 BCTs and essential CS/CSS capabilities annually from the RC to support joint force requirements for continuous operations.

Security Posture	**Steady-State Conditions**	**Surge Conditions**
Operational Demand	8-12 BCTs + Enablers	> 12 BCTs + Enablers
AC Rotation Goals	1:3 (Example: 9 months deployed and 27 months training in a 3 year cycle)	1:2 (Example: 1 year deployed and 2 years training in a 3 year cycle)
RC Rotation Goals	1:5 (Example: 1 year mobilized and 5 years demobilized in a 6 year cycle)	1:4 (Example: 1 year mobilized and 4 years demobilized in a 5 year cycle)

Fig. 15. Army Deployment Planning Objectives for Steady-State and Surge.

ARFORGEN supports the transition of RC units from a strategic reserve to an operational force. A critical element of this transition is the shift away from managing RC operational tempo by individuals to managing RC operational tempo by units. Because almost all reserve component units have been partially or completely mobilized in support of the Global War on Terrorism, the past mobilization policies and practices required the Army to rely on individual volunteers from the RC. Instead of cobbling together RC Soldiers after mobilization to form new units, the Army seeks to improve mission effectiveness, decrease the risk of casualties, and decrease the unit's post-mobilization training time by deploying trained, ready and cohesive RC units. ARFORGEN is designed to support the Army's goal for RC Soldiers to join together, train together, deploy together and fight together.

Fully implementing the Army Modular Force and Army Force Generation will yield a number of advantages in the future steady-state security posture to include:

- A continuous supply of 20-21 trained and ready modular BCTs with enablers in the available force pool to meet steady-state joint force requirements.
- The capability to surge an additional 20-21 BCTs with enablers from the ready force pool, given the time and resources to man, equip and train whole, cohesive units.
- Stabilized personnel who join, train, deploy and fight together in the same unit.
- A cyclic training process that supports the goal to be fully trained for full-spectrum operations in the full 3-year (AC) and 6-year (RC) operational deployment cycles.
- Recurrent, assured, predictable access to cohesive RC units.
- Reduced post-mobilization training time for RC units.
- Deployment planning objectives to identify high-demand, low-density units.
- More predictable unit deployments for the Army, Soldiers, families and employers.
- Allocating resources based on unit mission priorities and deployment schedules.
- The opportunity to synchronize a broad range of Generating Force processes.

The Army is adapting the Generating Force to support ARFORGEN. The Generating Force consists of those Army organizations whose primary mission is to generate and sustain the Operational Army's capabilities for employment by joint force commanders. Because it performs functions specified and implied by law, the Generating Force also possesses operationally useful capabilities for employment by or in direct support of joint force commanders. The enhancement of Generating Force capabilities is a critical component of Army transformation and is captured by a major objective within the Army Campaign Plan.

Generating Force transformation began in late 2005 with a series of decisions designed to achieve the following goals:

- Transform the institutional base to more efficiently perform Service Title 10 and executive agent functions that support implementation of Army Force Generation.
- Divest non-essential functions, remove unnecessary layering and duplication, consolidate functions, resource in the most cost-effective manner, and privatize or outsource functions where applicable.

- Develop a joint interdependent, end-to-end logistics structure that integrates a responsive civil-military sustaining base to meet Army operational requirements.
- Foster a culture of innovation to significantly increase institutional agility.
- Convert military positions to civilian positions, where appropriate, to improve availability of Soldiers for deploying units.

One example of Generating Force transformation is the effort to adapt Army training to support the Army Modular Force and ARFORGEN. Modular conversion has changed the training unit's organic capabilities and increased the number of BCTs that need training at the Combat Training Centers (CTCs). ARFORGEN demands more frequent deployments to support joint operations and consequently more training at the CTCs. The CTCs are reorganizing and modernizing their training systems and facilities to keep pace with Army transformation. The Army is expanding the Battle Command Training Program (BCTP) to meet the training needs from brigade to corps, including multi-functional support brigades and select functional support brigades. The Maneuver Combat Training Centers (MCTC) are evolving to meet BCT live training requirements. NTC and JRTC land expansion, completion of the NTC Urban Operation Center, and replacement of the Instrumentation System (IS) and Tactical Engagement Simulations (TES) are additional training capabilities required to support Army transformation and meet the Joint Readiness Training requirements. The Army is developing an Exportable Training Capability (ETC) to meet the additional demand by taking the CTC experience on the road. The CTC Program remains a cornerstone of Army training and readiness and is already in transition to meet the requirements of the Modular Force and ARFORGEN. Additionally, the Army is adapting the Training Support System (TSS) to support Army transformation, particularly at the unit's home station. Organizational changes, new equipment, and the new ARFORGEN training and readiness process significantly impact the training support systems that enable unit training strategies. The Army is modernizing ranges and battle command training centers to enable operator, unit, and leader-battlestaff training on the Army's digital systems. The Army is expanding urban operations centers to provide a full spectrum training capability. The Army is realigning the training aids, devices, simulators and simulations (TADSS) to support the increased training requirements. These efforts to adapt Army training are critical to support the Army Modular Force and ARFORGEN.

CONCLUSION

Army transformation builds a campaign-quality Army with joint and expeditionary capabilities now to provide relevant and ready landpower to combatant commanders and sustain the All-Volunteer Force in persistent conflict. The Army Modular Force, Army Modernization, Army Force Generation and Generating Force Transformation are three complementary initiatives that adapt Army to meet the challenges of the new security environment. Army transformation puts the Army on a wartime posture, reducing the operational risk accepted under tiered readiness to form whole, cohesive units that are fully manned, equipped and trained to accomplish their assigned mission. With additional resources, the Army will grow from 70 to 76 BCTs and approximately 225 support brigades to build strategic depth, meet the joint force requirements for continuous operations, and maintain the quality of the All-Volunteer Force. The Army Modular Force improves the strategic flexibility to tailor modular expeditionary forces to meet joint force requirements on a "plug and play" basis. It increases unit capabilities and force structure required to conduct full-spectrum operations in today's complex environments. It enables theater army, corps and division headquarters to meet the increased demand for joint force headquarters. The Future Combat Systems will improve strategic responsiveness while preserving full-spectrum dominance by striking the optimum balance of deployability, mobility, lethality and survivability. ARFORGEN implements a cyclic training and readiness process to generate modular expeditionary forces tailored to joint force requirements for continuous operations. Generating Force and business transformation improve the Army's ability to man, train, and equip Army operating forces during a period of limited resources and increased operational demand. Implementing these interlocking initiatives will increase unit capabilities, relieve stress on the force, provide additional time to train, create more predictable deployment schedules and enable the Army to provide a continuous supply of ready land power to support combatant commanders and civil authorities. Army transformation produces the optimum mix of land capabilities for the joint force commander, manages operational risk prudently, and is both affordable and essential for the Nation to win the war today and prepare for an uncertain future

Ultimately, Army transformation is about improving the capabilities of Soldiers to conduct full-spectrum joint operations and defend the Nation in the 21st century.